ABSTRACT: I critically review recent studies that estimate those costs of violence and conflict that can emerge among organized political groupings, from states, religious and ethnic organizations to guerillas and paramilitaries. The review includes studies that estimate direct and indirect costs due to internal conflicts (civil wars and other lowerlevel conflicts), terrorism, and external conflicts, including military spending. There are a number of key theoretical concerns on what counts as a cost, and, depending on the methods and evidence used, estimated costs vary widely. However, even minimum estimates are economically significant, especially for low-income countries. This is even more so when the costs of different types of organized conflict and violence are aggregated.
Violence can occur at virtually all levels of human interaction-from domestic violence within households, to fighting between youth gangs, to guerilla warfare, to wars between states or between alliances of states. Although all forms of conflict and violence can be expected to have economic consequences, this aspect has been neglected by economists until relatively recently.
1 However, research in this area has accelerated in the past decade as it becomes increasingly evident to academics and policymakers that wars and other conflicts have high costs that can severely impede economic development. In this paper I review recent studies that estimate the costs of violence and conflict that can emerge between organized political groupings such as states, religious and ethnic organizations, political parties, unions, guerillas, or paramilitaries. In particular, I
examine the costs associated with:
• Internal conflicts: More than 70 countries have experienced civil war since World
War II (Fearon and Laitin 2003) . The median length of a civil war is more than seven years and the costs include the loss of life (at least 16 million in such wars); the destruction of crops, buildings, and infrastructure; the cost of arms; the wages or opportunity cost of soldiers or guerrillas; the cost of injuries and psychological incapacitation (which can be long-lasting); as well as long-term consequences on investment and economic growth.
Civil war is not the sole form of violent conflict that can occur within countries. Lower-level insurgencies, as well as protests, strikes, boycotts, roadblocks, and similar "appropriative" activities that are undertaken by wellorganized groups can lead to violence. We will touch upon these lower-level 1 Studying the effects of conflict and violence from an economic perspective is perhaps more difficult than studying the effects of ordinary economic activities. This is because the basic theoretical framework of economics-and, as a result, much empirical research-assumes that property rights are perfectly and costlessly enforced. Conflict and violence directly contradict this assumption. Furthermore, engaging in conflict and violence against others is an adversarial activity, not a socially cooperative or productive one, as economic activities typically are. (For an overview of the theoretical literature on conflict that formally examines these issues, see Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007.) Identifying what is a cost (and what is a benefit) of conflict, then, can be confusing and potentially controversial. However, regardless of method, even the minimum estimated costs of conflict and violence appear to be higher than estimated deadweight costs that are typically of major concern to economists (such as the effects of taxation, regulation, or trade protection) and therefore potentially of higher economic significance than the effects of more exhaustively studied distortions.
types of conflict, although there is less evidence on them than there is for civil wars.
• Terrorism: In some cases, violence is directed at civilians who may not even be related to the political target of the perpetrating group, resulting in what has come to be referred to as terrorism. Properly speaking, terrorism is a tactic that is usually part of a larger conflict that can be internal to a country (like in Sri Lanka or Spain's Basque region) or transnational in scope (like that of al Qaeda). We review the costs of it separately from internal and external conflicts primarily because some of the recent literature on the costs of violence and conflict has focused on terrorism.
• External conflicts: Although external wars between states have been fewer and caused less direct damage than internal wars since World War II, they have remained very costly for some countries (for example, Afghanistan and Vietnam) that have been involved in such warfare. Despite the relative paucity of such wars, perceived external threats induce considerable military expenditures. For 2004 world military spending was estimated to be over 1 trillion dollars, about 2.6 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) (SIPRI 2005) , a considerable expenditure by any measure.
Excluded from this review are the costs of organized crime, a global activity in which the threat and use of violence are integral. Journalistic reports even argue that organized crime accounts for one-fifth of world GDP (Glenny 2008) . However, to my knowledge there are very few systematic economic studies that estimate the costs of violence due to organized crime and this is the main reason for excluding them here. 2 The costs of violence and conflict are not just those incurred directly when there is overt violence. Efforts to prevent overt violence from occurring, as during cold wars or in the low-level suppression of insurgencies, racks up economic costs as well. Consider that most military equipment and many soldiers have never faced or will never face war, yet still need to be purchased or paid. Moreover, the potential for conflict, even if it never materializes, can have powerful negative incentive effects on investment, trade, and economic growth. Though difficult to identify, some of the studies we review attempt to capture these negative effects of conflict potential that may never materialize
The first section of this paper briefly discusses the types of costs we review and the methods used to measure and estimate them. The second section reviews the estimates of different types of costs associated with civil war, other forms of internal conflict, terrorism, and external wars. Coverage of the expanding literature is not meant to be comprehensive: Instead, I selectively review contributions from the different categories of costs that have been examined. The final section identifies potential gaps of the costs that might not be adequately taken into account.
Methods of Measurement and Types of Costs
The cost to replace a house that has been destroyed during warfare, and the loss of the benefit of its services, can be calculated relatively easily. The cost of lost tourism in a volatile region, or the effects of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on its residents, however, are less easy to estimate and depend in part on the method of measurement and empirical model employed by the researcher. The range of probable values of such costs can then vary widely. In this way, a continuum of possibilities exists when estimating the costs of violence, from considering only the most direct costs that have an easily calculable value to estimating different indirect costs. These further depend on what channels of causality, scenarios, and counterfactuals are assumed or which models are estimated.
The methods to estimate costs that have been used in the literature reviewed here, as well as the types of costs that have been estimated, are now briefly discussed.
Direct Costs: Accounting Within and Outside Budgets
The costs that can be directly attributed to a violent event (or a series of such events, as in a war) can be in principle counted using conventional accounting methods. Some of these direct costs typically include the following:
• destroyed public infrastructure
• destroyed factories and machinery
• destroyed housing, autos, and other personal property
• budgetary appropriations for cost of war and cost of lost equipment
• deaths
• physical and mental injuries
• future costs of disability
• future costs of physical and mental health care
Information on some of these costs can be easily obtained or inferred from government budgets or estimated using straightforward methods. Other direct costs, however, can be more difficult to calculate. Even some costs that are part of a government's war budget can be hidden in items that are not related to any particular defense expenditure, let alone part of a particular appropriation for a war. For example, many of the expenditures of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are not to be found in the appropriation bills for these wars, but elsewhere in the U.S. budget (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008) .
Accounting for the costs of deaths and injuries also goes beyond the costs included in some budgets (such as the death and life insurance benefit for soldiers that might be provided by their country). Such accounting requires confronting the issue of the value of life and, even more seriously, whether the life of a citizen of a poor country should be valued differently than a citizen of a rich country. Other questions regarding some difficult-to-measure direct costs include: How do you account for the pain and suffering of the physically and mentally injured? What about the lost wages and other missed opportunities of family members who have to care for the long-term disabled? Moreover, since a substantial portion of these costs will be incurred in the future, calculating their present value requires not just estimates of their future trajectory but also assumptions about the discount rate that is employed in such calculations.
Indirect Costs
Indirect costs of violence and conflict typically include:
• population displacement
• reduced production due to violence or its threat
• reduced trade due to violence or its threat
• lower current and future physical investment
• reduction in educational opportunities • brain drain (that is, emigration of educated work force)
• reduced tourism from abroad
• other macroeconomic effects (inflation, further unemployment, reduced economic growth)
• overall welfare costs Simply using an accounting method does not suffice in the estimation of such costs. The use of counterfactual worlds in which conflict is absent, models of such worlds, econometric estimation, quasi-experimental methods, and combination of these methods have been used in estimating indirect costs of conflict. We briefly outline two main classes of these methods next.
Estimating indirect costs under different scenarios.
A simple way of estimating some indirect costs is to create scenarios in the absence of conflict and, based on previous empirical estimates of parameters under similar scenarios, make comparisons between the "conflict" and "nonconflict" scenarios.
A simple example of how some indirect effects might be estimated is found in the longrun effects of budgetary expenditures through "multiplier" effects. The cost of war expenditures on foreign soil, for instance, may not involve just its opportunity cost in other types of expenditures but may well lead to lower multiplier effects because a significant portion of the expenditures "leak" outside the country (see Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008 on the costs of the Iraq war). In a very different context, Evia et al. (2008) The advantage of such methods is that they are rather easy to perform and, if previous estimates of key parameters are reliable, the obtained estimates of costs can be plausible, at least as a first approximation. The disadvantage is that such estimates might take inadequate account of general equilibrium interactions and complex effects that cannot be detected through simple scenario calculations. However, these estimates are usually taken as rough, with wide bounds for probable range of values typically provided.
Estimating indirect costs via regressions.
With appropriate data, counterfactual scenarios could be estimated and tested econometrically. For instance, in a cross-country growth regression that includes a variable for a particular type of conflict, one could compare the differential effects of that conflict on growth by calculating the effect of the conflict variable in the estimated equation. 4 As an example of that approach, Collier (1999) employed such an approach for a sample of 92 countries (19 of which had civil wars), Given the econometric estimates, the effects of various types of conflict could be calculated by considering a "counterfactual" country or region that has the same characteristics as the country or region in question, but without conflict. Of course, such approaches can be criticized on many grounds. 6 The most fundamental problem is typically the possible endogeneity of conflict when estimating its costs and effects on investment, growth, capital flight, tourism, and so on, and therefore there is the possibility that the causality could be reverse from that assumed. After all, low or negative growth can cause conflict (Miguel et al. 2004) . Different studies attempt to overcome this problem by using Instrumental Variables, but some healthy skepticism is warranted in considering such estimates, just as in the case of the scenario-based estimates of indirect costs. The further one moves from easily measurable direct costs, the more uncertain and subject to argument are the estimates of many indirect costs.
Reviewing the Findings on the Costs of Conflict
In reviewing the findings I will break down the literature into four categories: Civil wars, lower-level internal conflicts, terrorism, and external wars. As civil wars have been most studied, and their effects have been the costliest and most wide-ranging for low-income countries, I will discuss civil wars in terms of the different categories of costs examined in the literature.
Internal Conflicts: Civil wars
Civil wars are typically defined as those types of internal conflict that involve the government and at least one other party. They also feature a threshold of deathstypically, 1,000 per year. 7 Collier et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive discussion of the different types of costs associated with civil wars and offer an overview of different quantitative estimates. The two edited volumes by Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) also contain a number of country studies and overall evaluation of the effects of war on economic development. Two recent overviews are Blattman and Miguel (2008) , a survey of the theory, causes, and consequences of civil wars, and Collier et al. (2008) , a policyoriented piece that includes estimates of the costs of civil wars. We provide a breakdown of the different types of costs and report some of the findings from these and other recent studies.
Budgetary costs. As reported in Collier et al. (2003) , the average developing country in 1995 (one with less than $3,000 per capita GDP) increased its military expenditures during civil wars from 2.8 to 5 percent of GDP. 8 That is, before accounting for other direct and indirect costs, on average the extra cost of military expenditures due to civil wars is 2.2 percent of GDP. Furthermore, other government revenues and expenditures-and, therefore, the public goods they supply-tend to decrease with the length of the war. In a sample of six countries, for example, report that tax revenues during war decreased or remained flat relative to GDP in five (Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda) and increased in only one (Nicaragua). Then, reductions in the fiscal capacity of states to provide for public goods such as basic health care and other social services induces various indirect effects on the population to withstand disease, injury, malnutrition, and poverty.
7 However, there are considerable issues of concern in the definitions that are employed in data sources. The different thresholds for deaths and the classification of a war as internal (instead of, say, colonial) are two of the main concerns. Sambanis (2004) provides a detailed account of the issues and the empirical consequences of using different definitions of civil war. 8 There is no direct reference on how these figures were calculated, but it appears they were derived by using the estimated coefficients for a cross-country type regression. Additionally, note that a higher percentage of GDP devoted to military expenditures could, in principle, result from a sufficiently precipitous drop in GDP without a change in actual defense expenditures. However, the reduction in per capita GDP due to civil war was estimated to be on the order of 2 percent by Collier (1999) and growth rates for a country in civil war are not typically negative. Therefore, the increases in military expenditures cannot be due to decreases in GDP alone. Effects on growth. According to Collier's (1999) estimates, countries at war grow around 2.2 percentage points more slowly than during peace. Long-lasting wars tend to induce lower levels of growth. Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2001) calculate the difference in growth rates for 14 countries at war and compare them with those of comparable countries. They found them lagging on average about 3.4 percentage points in GDP.
Destruction of capital, investment

9
More recently, Cerra and Saxena (2008) estimate the effect of civil wars on economic growth using the beginning of civil war as a shock in a VAR model. Using impulse response functions, the immediate effect of a civil war is estimated to induce a reduction of 6 percentage points in GDP, although almost half of that loss is recovered after about six years, and the long-run estimates are imprecise in the sense that the standard error bands allow for the possibility of a zero long-run effect. In the event of a long civil war, Speaking of regional differences, Miguel and Roland (2006) exploit the regional variation of the air bombing campaign of the U.S. in Vietnam in order to estimate long-run effects of conflict. They find that areas that suffered heavy bombing did not suffer a long-run negative impact on poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, or literacy. It could be that this finding is due to the absence of long-run effects from bombing. Nevertheless, it is also likely that the Vietnamese government directed more resources towards the areas that were heavily bombed-they may have built more modern infrastructure that enhanced the growth potential of these areas over those that were not as heavily bombed, and thus retained their older infrastructure. In addition, Vietnam has been a rather poor country in terms of absolute levels of income since the war ended, and the war likely had an effect on its growth rate. The possible diversion of resources to the more heavily bombed areas likely reduced the country's overall growth rate.
Another long-term effect of civil war according to Collier et al. (2003) million DALYs were directly attributed to wars (Ghobarah et al. 2003) . Moreover, However, the evidence on how civil war affects the psychology of war participants, victims, and community life is not completely one-sided. Bellows and Miguel (2008) have used household data on conflict experiences and postwar outcomes to examine the effects of the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone. They found those who experienced increased violence are 2.6 percent more likely to vote and 6.5 percent more likely to attend community meetings and contribute to public goods. "Civil war experiences are transformative for many, and our analysis suggests that one short-run legacy is increasing individual political participation, community activism, and local public good provision." 13 However, the sample is highly localized so that no general inference can be made about the whole country. Blattman (2008) also finds that forcibly conscripted soldiers in Uganda actually increased their political participation compared to a control group. These two studies raise the possibility that at least some individuals in some cultures might be psychologically resilient to being victims of violence in ways that make them, if they survive, more determined to participate socially and politically in their communities.
Although many of the costs we have already mentioned are difficult to estimate, there are still others that are so difficult to estimate it is almost impossible to monetize them, and thus they are unable to be compared with the other costs. For example, the very old, the very young, the infirm, and the poorest are more vulnerable to the direct and indirect effects of civil wars and are therefore more likely to suffer. In other words, civil wars appear to disproportionately affect the poor and most vulnerable members of society.
Studies like those of Merrouche (2008) do provide estimates of specific effects on poverty (landmines, in this case). Yet quantifying this effect beyond the reduction of income for those involved is a matter of debate. Aggregate estimates of the increased risk of mortality and morbidity could identify some of the costs of poverty and vulnerability. However, the value of less poverty in itself, or the possible higher value of an extra dollar to a poor versus a rich person are issues that have been, and will likely continue to be, debated within the economics and policy communities. Justino (2006) provides a summary of research and of the methodological issues of both the effects of war on poverty and how chronic poverty might induce war. Collier et al. (2008) have ventured to make some overall estimates of the costs incurred by civil war. Counting only the direct costs for an average low-income country, as well as those imposed on its neighbors as a result of the war, the estimated total cost is $43 billion. 14 Adding estimates for the costs of death and DALYs yield a total minimum cost of almost $60 billion for a single civil war. Based on that estimate and the number of civil wars that have taken place since 1960, the yearly cost of civil war is estimated to be $123 billion, which is about the same order of magnitude as the total annual development aid. Collier et al. (2008) , however, think that a better estimate of the indirect costs of a typical civil war is not $60 billion but closer to $250 billion. That is, according to their 14 The costs to neighbors ($23 billion) are actually higher than those to the country itself ($20 billion).
(There is no description in the paper of the methods used to arrive at the costs for the country itself.) The estimates of the cost to neighbors use the results from Murdoch and Sandler (2002) that are based on an estimated growth model that allows for such spillover effects.
estimates, the minimum cost of civil wars equals all the development aid provided, but is likely to be much higher than that.
Lower-level Internal Conflicts
Civil wars, by definition, result in many deaths (typically, 1,000) that involve the government and at least one other domestic organized adversary. Conflicts with lower death tolls that are not formally classified as civil wars, however, can have high longterm indirect costs as well. Moreover, other lower-level conflicts between organized groups can involve violence or, even if there is no direct violence, the possibility of violence is ever present. Strikes, road blockades, or protests that might have economic, ethnic, or regional motivation, or disputes between organized prospective squatters and landowners are examples of common conflicts. As is the case with the other types of conflict we examine, these too involve direct and indirect costs. However, there is rarely destruction of property, few direct deaths or injuries, and typically related actions are dispersed geographically, even if frequent and economically disruptive. As a result, there is little standardized information (or, "data") that is systematically gathered so that even the most direct costs of such conflicts can be assessed. Their long-term indirect effects, though, could be as economically disruptive as those of civil wars. 
Riascos and Vargas (2004) summarize results of research that includes the costs of
common crime and other conflict in Colombia. They estimate these to be at least 3 percent of GDP, with some estimates going as high as 15 percent. Note that a 3 percent annual cost of conflict implies that after 24 years, a country would have 50 percent less income than it would otherwise obtain in the absence of such conflict.
Terrorism
One definition of terrorism is the use of violence against civilians by organized groups.
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Since it is a tactic in the conduct of violence, it can and has been used in civil wars, other internal conflicts, and even in international disputes. The disproportionately large number of civilian casualties (compared to previous wars) during the Second World War and wars since could be attributed to such a tactic (and the technology that made such tactics possible). However, the data and the related empirical literature focus on the activities of organized groups that are often, but not always, militarily weak in other ways, and thus employ terrorism as a primary tactic. For example, almost all instances of systematic mutilation or raping of civilians (which can have a political purpose from the perpetrator's viewpoint) that have occurred in many post-World War II civil wars, especially those that have occurred in Africa, are not typically included in the data used in studies of terrorism.
A main distinction is made between terrorism committed for domestic purposes, such as the actions of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and terrorism committed for transnational purposes, like those of al Qaeda. Two recent overviews of the costs of terrorism are Enders (2007) and Sandler and Enders (2008) . 15 Often it is specified that terrorist violence has a political purpose. Whereas in the large majority of cases political purpose is a feature of what is called terrorism, there are some cases in which it does not have to be so. For example, mafias and gangs can engage in terrorism in order to expand their turf and profits, and there is no scientific or policy reason for excluding in principle such activity from the definition of terrorism. Sometimes actions of organized crime groups might even take political dimensions, even though the clarity of that dimension might be murky. For example, Pablo Escobar, of the Colombian Medellin cartel, made a clear bid for political power by employing actions against civilians could be considered terrorism. Another qualification typically provided, and which is followed by all the studies reviewed here, is that the organized groups are nonstate actors, even though, again, there is no scientific or policy reason that terrorist actions undertaken by governments should be excluded from consideration.
With the exception of major incidents like those of 9/11 and the Madrid bombings, the direct costs of individual terrorist incidents are usually not large. Even the direct cost of 9/11 has not been large relative to GDP. 16 Therefore, the main effects that could exist, if any, would be indirect, confined to perceptions of security and their effect on investment and other economic activities.
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) This composite region is then compared to the actual Basque region. They find that the Basque region by the late 1990s was about 10 percent poorer than it would have been without terrorism. Abadie and Gardeazabal perform a number of robustness tests, including a "placebo" test in which they create a synthetic region that resembles
Catalonia. This region, contrary to the composite Basque region, did not perform differently compared to the actual Catalonia region.
On another tack, Blomberg et al. (2004) take a macroeconomic perspective on the issue.
In addition to terrorism, they also examine the effects of internal and external conflict on growth across 177 countries. They only consider transnational terrorist incidents, with the measures of internal conflict presumably being highly correlated with domestic terrorism. Through cross-country regressions they find the effect of terrorism to be statistically significant, but the quantitative effect is economically very small and smaller than those of internal or external conflicts. Furthermore, the estimation of a structural VAR model showed that negative shocks to GDP due to internal or external conflicts yield much larger and longer-lived effects than those obtained from a negative shock due to terrorism. Blomberg et al. (2004) Furthermore, given that the GTI is compiled by country experts (typically not from the country being evaluated), the index may reflect not so much "terrorism" risk but the types of other risks that typically lead foreign investors to reduce investment in a country. That is, GTI might not be truly exogenous as far as its effect on FDI is concerned.
The estimated costs of terrorism are either very small or, as in the case of Spain's Basque region, of the order of 10 percent of GDP. That is considerably lower than the effects of either civil war or lower-level internal conflict. Moreover, as I have stressed, terrorism is a tactic and not an altogether different type of conflict. ETA's campaign used terrorist tactics but also, I suspect, the Basque region had more strikes, protests, and other manifestations of lower-level conflicts than other regions of Spain had. That is, the difficulty of finding strong effects of terrorism could be due to the fact that it is inherently difficult to isolate terrorism's effect from the broader context of conflict. When terrorist tactics are isolated from broader internal conflicts, as in the case of richer countries (with exceptions like those of the Basque region), the effects are negligible. When terrorism is just one part of a larger internal conflict, as it usually is in low-income countries, the effects are stronger as they are correlated with these broader conflicts.
External Conflicts
There have been considerably fewer external wars than internal wars since World War II, but the two types of war cannot be completely separated. After all, for much of this time 17 Note that, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Japan's Constitution prohibits a military and, thus, these are formally considered "police" or "internal security"
expenditures.
18 However, some military R&D expenditures have direct civilian applications or are disguised civilian R&D. In fact, many major breakthroughs in technology-the Internet, various high-tech materials, computers, shipbuilding-have their roots in military R&D. One could possibly argue, then, that military spending is worth it just for the tremendous technological benefits it has afforded nations. However, it must be asked why one should spend money on military R&D in the hope of receiving some future uncertain technological benefits rather than directly investing in R&D for targeted civilian applications.
Other than this recent work, there appears to be a relative scarcity of studies that estimate the long-term costs of external wars. Blomberg et al. (2004) and Hess (2003) do so only parenthetically as they examine the effects of other types of conflict, though they both find that external wars negatively impact growth.
However, an older literature regarding the effects of military expenditures on economic growth has found positive effects, presumably due to short-run demand effects or longrun technological externality effects. I will not review this literature here, but Knight et al. (1996) provide an overview and find negative effects on growth. Moreover, as Dunne et al. (2005) point out, such empirical studies are hampered by the fact that they are based on either defense-economics models or expanded endogenous growth models that emphasize the possible technological externalities of military expenditures without taking adequate account of the resource cost of these expenditures. Moreover, apparently in none of these empirical approaches is the possibility that military expenditures are determined strategically (that is, in reaction to potential adversaries).
Overview of Costs
I am aware of just one study that attempts a comprehensive estimate of the costs of conflict from many different sources: Hess (2003) . 19 Hess adapts a model of Lucas 
Open Issues and Future Directions
Economists have only recently been interested in the costs of conflict and violence as a legitimate policy concern and as an endeavor worthy of study. With the exception of the literature that relates military expenditures to economic growth, virtually all research on the costs of conflict and violence has occurred over the past decade. Already, though, the literature has grown extensively, and, if anything, the pace of research is gaining speed, especially research on civil war. The increasing interest is obviously warranted given that the costs of conflict and violence are quantitatively very significant, arguably more significant than any other measured economic costs that might be relevant to economic development.
Some direct costs are easily measurable, such as those due to destruction or increased government spending. However, most costs, even direct ones such as those associated with death and injury, are not easy to estimate, let alone indirect costs that might result from lower investment, capital flight, or reduced tourism. Such estimates are based on either deterministic scenarios or stochastic models that are econometrically estimated, the latter of which often suffer from small samples or even data of questionable provenance.
Researchers and policymakers are unlikely to agree on the relevance or appropriateness of particular scenarios or models and, therefore, on the estimated costs derived from them. It is healthy, even vital, to consider a wide range of opinions and methodologiessuch diversity is often key to arriving at well-rounded estimates. In some cases, general agreement might be unattainable simply because there are too many disagreements about processes or causal mechanisms. Finally, the personal views of those involved may significantly cloud the issue (as, for example, when poverty and inequality are considered to have costs beyond those that reduce a country's income).
I will now briefly discuss remaining issues and future directions for measuring and estimating costs associated with the four types of conflict reviewed. I will close with general remarks on assessing the costs of conflict.
Civil wars. As is apparent from the work reviewed here, civil wars have received the lion's share of researchers' attention. Such attention seems warranted when one considers the large number of civil wars in the post-war period, not to mention their human and economic costs. Detailed studies of country experiences along with comparative assessments, such as those discussed in Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) , are helpful complements to econometric studies that rely on more aggregated data. In particular, it is encouraging to witness recent trends in microbased studies, such as those of Bellows and Miguel (2008) Another quantitatively important effect emphasized by Collier et al. (2003) and Collier et al. (2008) is the spillover effect of war on neighboring countries, following on the work of Murdoch and Sandler (2002) , who appear to have made the sole estimates of such spillover effects. Finally, the expected effect of internal wars and other types of conflict on investment and capital flight does not always appear as statistically or economically significant (for example, see Blomberg et al., 2004) . Since this effect is expected to be one of the key channels through which wars negatively impinge economic growth, it is important to continue investigating the relationship both in country and comparative studies.
Lower-level internal conflicts. As argued by Sambanis (2004) , the particular definition of civil war adopted in any cross-country comparison can significantly change the results. This is indicative of the fact that civil wars are not completely distinct from all other types of internal (or external) conflict. Rather, there is a continuum of conflict intensities that might include, say, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda on one end of the spectrum, and the myriad of internal conflicts that involve minimal violence or the threat of violence (such as strikes or road blockades) on the other. The middle and lower ends of the spectrum have been understudied, and severely so when compared to the study of civil wars. been no effort to systematically create databases that classify and measure aspects of these softer types of internal conflicts as there has been for civil wars. Yet, given the limited evidence obtained thus far, the long-term costs of such conflicts could well be of a similar order of magnitude to those of civil wars. It is highly advisable, then, to collect evidence at both the micro and macro levels, as has been done in research on civil wars.
Terrorism. Since terrorism is correlated with other types of conflict, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the tactic itself from the wider conflict to which it might be a part.
Future studies would find value in pursuing the approach of Blomberg et al. (2004) , who include in regressions other types of conflict to tease out substitution or complementary effects.
External conflicts. A major unresolved issue that pertains to the costs of external wars is that of the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth. As we mentioned above, the main problem is disentangling the negative effect of military spending that results from the reduction of resources that become unavailable for consumption or investment-and any distortions that might be associated with thesefrom the possible positive effects of military spending that results because output is below its potential level or that results from technological and organizational externality 20 See for example Ross (2003) and Mehlum et al. (2006). effects to the rest of the economy. It appears that all of the models thus estimated do not adequately take into account the resource cost of military expenditures. They especially fail to take into account the endogeneity of expenditures to those of other countries or to the choices of internal potential enemies (to the extent that some countries direct their military expenditures against such enemies). 21 It is therefore advisable to account for how strategic feedback affects security and military expenditures when studying their effect on economic growth.
Furthermore, the related literature has relied solely on cross-country evidence using aggregated data (for example, GDP, investment, military expenditures, and other aggregate variables). More detailed country case studies could break down the various components of military expenditures, investment, and other variables. Institutional knowledge of a country's economy and government
should not be ignored when making assessments about the composition of these components, their relationship to each other, and to economic growth.
Adding up the costs of organized violence. I am not aware of any attempt to add up all the types of organized violence costs that are reviewed in this paper. Hess (2003) comes closest, but as discussed earlier, his approach is highly indirect and "top-down" in that he estimates, using a cross-country econometric framework, the effects of the "shock" of conflict on consumption. Whereas this is a valuable approach that has produced plausible estimates (and expanding and refining Hess's approach would be most welcome), there is scope in also pursuing a "bottom-up" approach, whereby direct and indirect costs of the various types of organized violence are estimated and tabulated for individual countries and for the whole world. Collier et al. (2008) do provide overall estimates for the cost of civil wars, but there is no documentation in that paper on how these estimates were derived. Having both bottom-up and top-down estimates of the total costs of organized violence would help check the plausibility of the other mechanism. If the estimates do not vary too widely from one another, one can have high confidence in them.
A final, fundamental issue of concern to economists and policymakers must be mentioned, though unfortunately not in appreciable detail. 22 An argument could be made that at least some of the costs of war and violence are necessary, as they could be considered the costs of "enforcing property rights" by states or other organized interests.
Military expenditures and other security costs, even possibly the very destruction that ensues from the outbreak of wars, could be considered a necessary input into an output called "security." Therefore, from a social welfare perspective, these may not be considered avoidable (without incurring other costs at some point). A very short response to this suggestion would first point out that, contrary to other inputs in economics, the inputs to conflict and violence are combined in an adversarial fashion, not cooperatively as are inputs to ordinary production. Secondly, military increases by one party that are met with similar increases by another would increase the costs of security to both parties without necessarily changing the security of either, however that latter is measured. (On the contrary, the military build-up could make war more likely, and, as a result, decrease the security of both.) Whereas the response of states and other organized groups could indeed be considered individually rational in the short term, it does not imply that the resulting state of affairs is socially rational. The outcome is similar to that of the prisoners' dilemma: if each side could commit to their actions, they could achieve a better outcome for both. Furthermore, economists routinely calculate the costs of socially suboptimal actions (such as those of trade protection) in other settings, where the actual policies are compared to ideal policies. Likewise, then, we can think of the costs of organized violence as due to deviations of actual security policies that are suboptimal from an ideal world. What is also different from other settings, however, is the possibility that in the actual world, the costs of providing security may increase dramatically while the benefits derived from it are drastically reduced, as is the case in wars that escalate beyond the original expectations of their participants. 22 For a detailed treatment of related issues, see Skaperdas (2008) .
